RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.
Isaac Gibson brought suit against the City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officer Vincent Baldassano (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging claims of false arrest, excessive force, and a state law claim of malicious prosecution. (R. 1, Compl.) After a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Gibson and against Defendants as to his claim of false arrest, and in favor of Defendants and against Gibson as to his claims of excessive force and malicious prosecution. Presently before the Court is Gibson's motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("Section 1988"). (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Gibson filed this lawsuit against Defendants on August 23, 2010. (R. 1, Compl.) Gibson alleged that on June 13, 2009, he observed several police officers arresting and hitting two men who had been involved in a fight in the area. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) He claimed that when he began taking pictures of the officers hitting the men, Officer Baldassano approached him and grabbed his camera phone. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Gibson further alleged that after he took the phone back, Officer Baldassano grabbed him and "violently swung" his body into a fence, and Gibson's face hit a crate attached to the fence, resulting in a large gash under his eye. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.) Officer Baldassano signed criminal complaints against Gibson for mob action and resisting arrest, but Gibson contended that there was no probable cause for these charges and that Officer Baldassano acted "willfully and wantonly, maliciously, and with a conscious disregard and deliberate indifference" to Gibson's rights. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Gibson was found not guilty of both charges after a trial on June 14, 2010. (Id. ¶ 20.) As a result of these events, Gibson claimed he suffered damages including loss of physical liberty, physical pain and suffering, disfigurement, emotional distress, and pecuniary damages including attorneys' fees, money posted as bond, and lost wages. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Based on these events, Gibson brought claims of excessive force and false arrest pursuant to Section 1983, and a state law claim for malicious prosecution. (Id. ¶¶ 23-32.) Gibson also brought state law respondeat superior and indemnification claims. (Id. ¶¶ 33-36.) He sought compensatory and punitive damages.
On August 5, 2011, after a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Gibson and against Defendants as to his claim of false arrest, and in favor of Defendants and against Gibson as to his claims of excessive force and malicious prosecution. (R. 64, Verdict.) The jury awarded Gibson $7,500 in compensatory damages. (Id.)
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act provides that: "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of ... [Section 1983] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable fee as part of the costs[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court's analysis of an appropriate fee award begins with determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to "prevailing party" status. Linda T. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir.2005).
As the party seeking the award of attorney's fees, Gibson bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the time expended and hourly rates charged by his attorneys used to determine the Lodestar amount. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933; Spellan v. Bd. of Ed. for Dist. 111, 59 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir.1995). Gibson requests a total of $207,502.50 in attorneys' fees calculated as follows:
Attorney Hourly Rate Hours Total per Attorney
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Jackowiak $425 217.6 $ 92,480.00
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Hamilton $425 135 $ 57,375.00
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Yarusso $350 36.8 $ 12,880.00
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Nicholas $275 96.8 $ 26,620.00
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Melyon $175 103.7 $ 18,147.50
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TOTAL $207,502.50
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(R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 6.)
The Court first addresses the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Gibson's attorneys. A "reasonable" hourly rate is "one that is `derived from the market rate for the services rendered.'" Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir.2003)). Thus, an attorney's actual billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate. Id. If an attorney uses contingent fee arrangements, the "next best evidence" of the attorney's market rate is "evidence of rates similarly experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases." Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir.1999). The Seventh Circuit has "expressed a preference for third party affidavits that attest to the billing rates of comparable attorneys." Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640. The party seeking fees "bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the other party to offer evidence that sets forth "good reason" why a lower rate
Gibson seeks a rate of $425 per hour for the time Lawrence Jackowiak, an attorney in practice since 1995, expended on Gibson's case. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 6.) In support of this rate, Gibson has submitted Jackowiak's own affidavit, the affidavits of two attorneys, and a comparison of the requested rate with the Laffey Matrix. (Id.) Although this evidence provides some support for the requested rate, the Court concludes that Gibson has failed to carry his burden and that a lower rate for Jackowiak's work in this case is warranted.
The evidence put forth by Gibson in support of Jackowiak's requested rate is weak at best. First, Jackowiak's affidavit fails to provide any evidence of the rates he charges or has charged in the past, fee awards he has received in similar cases, or rates charged by comparable attorneys. Instead, after listing his qualifications, he merely concludes that his rate of $425 per hour is "well within the range of normal hourly rates charged by attorneys of comparable ability and experience in the Chicago area during the same time period." (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 1 ¶ 8.)
The affidavits provided by attorneys Francis Kasbohm and Marcelle LeCompte are similarly unsupported. Again, both attorneys merely list their own qualifications, comment briefly on Jackowiak's qualifications, and conclude that the requested rate is "within the range of normal hourly rates charged by attorneys with similar experience," (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 8 ¶ 9), and "reasonable and commensurate with the rates charged by other attorneys," (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 9 ¶ 11.)
Finally, Gibson relies on the Laffey Matrix, a guideline the United States Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C, has created to estimate reasonable attorneys' fees, to support the requested rate for Jackowiak.
The only evidence before the Court of a rate received by any attorney relevant to Jackowiak's requested rate is a case submitted by Defendants in which Jackowiak was awarded fees at a rate of $325 per hour in late 2008. See Lee v. City of Chi., 07 C 2035, 2008 WL 5377798, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 18, 2008). Based on this rate, Defendants argue that the more appropriate rate for Jackowiak is $350 per hour because a 30% increase in his rate over a two-and-a-half-year period is "entirely unwarranted." (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 19.)
Taking into account all of this evidence, the Court concludes that a rate of $395 per hour is reasonable. While Gibson has provided evidence that $425 per hour for Jackowiak's work is "within the range" of "comparable" attorneys, the Court finds that the more persuasive evidence of the $325 per hour fee award Jackowiak received in late 2008 indicates that a lower rate in this case is reasonable. See Jeffboat, LLC v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 553 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.2009) ("[A] previous attorneys' fee award is useful for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work whether it is disputed or not."). Defendants' proposed rate of $350, which "reflect[s] inflation" since Jackowiak was awarded a rate of $325 per hour, (R. 77, Defs.' Resp.), fails to take into account the experience gained by Jackowiak during that time and the resulting increase in his hourly rate. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Defendants that a $100 dollar increase in Jackowiak's rate over a two-and-a-half-year
Gibson next requests a rate of $425 per hour for Torreya Hamilton. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 6-7.) In support of this request, Gibson provides an affidavit from Hamilton, affidavits from two practicing attorneys, Jeffrey B. Granich and Thomas Needham, and the Laffey Matrix rates. (Id.) This evidence, however, suffers from the same deficiencies as the evidence in support of Jackowiak's requested rate. Hamilton's affidavit does not provide any evidence of the rates she charges or has charged clients, or fees she has been awarded in the past. Nor does she cite any rates charged by comparable attorneys, or fees awarded to comparable attorneys. She merely lists her qualifications and states that her billing rate is $425 per hour and that she "believe[s] this rate to be commensurate with civil rights attorneys with [her] experience and skill." (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 2.) The affidavits of Granich and Needham, while effusive in their praise of Hamilton's skills and experience as a trial lawyer, also fail to support their conclusions that the rate sought by Hamilton is "eminently reasonable," (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 6), and "reasonable and well-deserved." (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 10.) As both parties agree that Hamilton and Jackowiak are "attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation," however, the Court concludes that a rate of $395 per hour is reasonable in this case for the time expended by Hamilton.
Gibson seeks a rate of $275 per hour for Adele Nicholas. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 7.) Defendants do not object to this rate, and the Court concludes that it is reasonable.
Gibson seeks a rate of $350 per hour for Amanda Yarusso. (Id.) Defendants argue that Yarusso should receive the same rate as Nicholas because Yarusso only worked on the final pretrial order and motions in limine in the case. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 19-20.) The Court does not find this to be a persuasive argument for a reduction in Yarusso's rate, as Yarusso has five more years of experience than Nicholas, and Yarusso's rate is supported by her own detailed affidavit and the affidavit of Amanda Antholt, both of which provide examples of rates received by attorneys of similar levels of experience as Yarusso. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Exs. 4, 11.) Accordingly, the Court concludes Yarusso's rate of $350 per hour is a reasonable market rate.
Finally, Gibson requests a rate of $175 per hour for attorney Ryan Melyon. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 8.) Defendants do not object to this rate, and the Court finds that it is reasonable.
The Court now turns to the second figure in the Lodestar calculation — the hours Gibson's attorneys "reasonably expended" litigating Gibson's case. The Supreme Court has directed that "[c]ounsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Accordingly, if the prevailing party fails to exercise the proper billing judgment, a court should exclude from the fee calculation "hours that were not `reasonably expended.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Defendants first argue that Gibson's attorneys engaged in impermissible "block billing" by combining several discrete tasks in a single billing entry without specifying the amount of time spent on each task. (Id. at 4.) While block billing "does not provide the best possible description of attorneys' fees, it is not a prohibited practice." Farfaras v. Citizens Bank and Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir.2006). Nevertheless, "when the [attorney's] time records do not describe tasks with particularity, and do not reveal the amount of time claimed to have been spent on a particular task, the judge is in no position to make a reasonable estimate of the amount of time that should have been required." Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 421 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1119 (N.D.Ill.2006). As a result, courts have reduced or denied attorneys' fees where block billing and vague descriptions have left them unable to discern whether the amount of time spent on each individual task was reasonable. See Cooper v. Verifications, Inc., No. l:04-CV-385-TS, 2008 WL 5332190, at *12 (N.D.Ind. Dec. 18, 2008) ("Where a court finds hours to be insufficiently documented, it may disallow those hours or reduce the entire fee award by a proportionate amount.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is thus whether the time entries are "sufficiently detailed to permit the Court to determine whether the hours expended were reasonable and necessary to the conduct of the litigation." Crispin R., Jr. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., Dist. 299, No. 09-CV-3993, 2010 WL 3701328, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 10, 2010). The Seventh Circuit has indicated that "the amount of itemization and detail required is a question for the market[.]" In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir.2001). Thus, "[i]f counsel submits bills with the level of detail that paying clients find satisfactory, a federal court should not require more." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Defendants object to 60 entries as improper block billing, totaling 67 hours for Jackowiak, 14.4 hours for Nicholas, 23.6 hours for Yarusso, and 5.1 hours for Melyon.
Regarding Jackowiak's entries, there are a number of entries that list conferring with co-counsel among other tasks, without separating the time for each task or providing additional information about the meeting with co-counsel. Without further detail, the Court is not able to determine whether the amount of time spent on each task is reasonable in the following entries: October 10, 2010(.7); November 1, 2010(.6); December 14, 2010(1.1); January 7, 2011(.8); April 14,
As to Defendants' objections to block billing by Nicholas, the Court agrees that the lack of detail and the "lumping together" of multiple tasks in the following entries inhibit the Court's inquiry into the reasonableness of the time expended: November 10, 2010(2.8); March 10, 2011(1.3); March 29, 2011(1.4); July 5, 2012(1.6). (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 16.) Because these entries should have specified the time for each individual task and included descriptions more informative than the vague "preparation" for various court appearances, the Court will reduce this time by half, leading to a deduction of 3.55 hours from Nicholas' time. See United Cent. Bank v. Kanan Fashions, Inc., No. 10 CV 331, 2012 WL 1409245, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 23, 2012) (reducing hours by 50% where entries merely stated "prepare for" hearing); see also Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that when time records "lump together multiple tasks," it is "impossible to evaluate their reasonableness") (citation omitted).
Turning to the time sheets of Yarusso and Melyon, the Court finds that the entries are sufficiently detailed to permit the Court to assess the reasonableness of the time expended. Although several entries combine discrete tasks without specifying the amount of time spent on each task, the combined tasks are related and were performed in connection with the same end-product. Thus, the Court will not reduce the hours of Yarusso or Melyon based on Defendants' "block billing" objection.
Defendants next object to time expended by Hamilton and Yarusso after they were brought on the case that Defendants characterize as "catch-up time." (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 7.) According to Defendants, the "substantial amount of time"
Defendants next seek a significant reduction in Melyon's hours based on Gibson's failure to prove that the hours he billed were "reasonably expended." (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 9-11.) The Court agrees that Gibson has largely failed to justify the 103.7 hours in attorneys' fees billed by Melyon, and his hours must be reduced accordingly. Melyon was admitted to the Illinois bar in 2010, and Gibson's trial appears to be his first trial experience. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 5.) As Defendants point out, and Gibson does not dispute, although Melyon billed time for attending the entirety of the trial as well as certain pre-trial events such as the deposition of Tinithia Smith, he did not examine a single witness or make an argument to the Court, and he did not even file an appearance on the case until after the trial concluded. While gaining experience during Gibson's trial was undoubtedly beneficial to Melyon, Gibson has not demonstrated that these hours were "reasonably expended." Additionally, some of Melyon's time was billed for tasks that are clerical in nature and therefore noncompensable, such as organizing and producing files for other attorneys and traveling to an office supply store to have an exhibit made. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553. The Court will accordingly deduct the hours Melyon billed for attending the trial and Tinithia Smith's deposition as well as for time he spent on clerical tasks. This reduction totals 48.7 hours.
Contrary to Defendants' contentions, however, Gibson has sufficiently justified some time billed by Melyon. This time falls in two categories. In the first category is time billed by Melyon that was "reasonably expended" in the course of the litigation and that may be billed at Melyon's rate of $175 per hour. This includes time Melyon spent reviewing files, strategizing with co-counsel, analyzing the video provided by the police that was presented at trial, and preparing the bill of costs and his fee petition. The following entries fall in this category: July 25, 2011 (.8,1.5, 2.5); July 26, 2011 (.6, .5, .3); July 27, 2011 (.2,.2); July 28, 2011(1.5); July 29, 2011(1.6); July 30, 2011 (.3, 2.5); July 31, 2011 (2.6, 6); August 3, 2011(1); September 1, 2011 (3, .2); September 2, 2011(2). (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 18.) Accordingly, 27.3 hours of the time billed by Melyon is recoverable at a rate of $175 per hour.
The second category of time Melyon billed that is compensable is time for tasks that are more appropriately reimbursed
Next, Defendants object to certain hours billed by Gibson's attorneys that Defendants contend are duplicative. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 11.) Because duplicative time that could not be reasonably billed to a client also cannot be billed to an adversary through a fee-shifting statute, the Seventh Circuit has cautioned that "the tendency of law firms to overstaff a case should cause the trial court to scrutinize a fees petition carefully for duplicative time[.]" Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted); see also Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assoc., P.C., 574 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir.2009) (nothing that courts are "encouraged to scrutinize fee petitions for duplicative billings when multiple lawyers seek fees"). At the same time, the Seventh Circuit has also recognized that merely because two lawyers have billed for the same task does not mean that the hours should be deducted. See Tchemkou v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, the relevant inquiry remains whether the time was "reasonably expended."
Here, Defendants contend that 4.6 hours of Jackowiak's time spent working on the police video and the preparation of witness binders should be excluded as duplicative of the time claimed by Melyon for the same tasks. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 11.) In response, Gibson argues "[i]t was imminently reasonable for both attorneys to prepare video recordings for presentation at trial and review exhibit binders together" and that Defendants "have offered no basis for their contention that this time should be excluded other than their blanket statement that it is `duplicative.'" (R. 81, Pl.'s Reply at 14.) Gibson's argument ignores the fact that it is his burden to prove the reasonableness of his requested attorneys' fees, and his conclusory statement that it was "imminently reasonable" for both attorneys to bill that time does not persuade the Court that the time
Defendants also argue that the attendance of both Hamilton and Jackowiak at the deposition of Tinithia Smith was unnecessary, and that the 3.5 hours Hamilton billed for the preparation and attendance at the deposition should be deducted as duplicative. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 11.) The Court disagrees. As Gibson points out, Smith was not disclosed by Defendants until a week before trial, and she was a key witness for Gibson. Given the time constraints and the importance of Smith as a witness, it was reasonable for both Hamilton and Jackowiak to attend the deposition, and the Court declines to reduce Hamilton's hours based on this objection.
Defendants next object to the 34.6 hours spent by Gibson's attorneys on the final pretrial order and motions in limine. (Id. at 12-13.) Defendants have identified 11.2 hours billed by Jackowiak and 23.4 hours billed by Yarusso for the preparation and editing of the order and motions. (Id.) They contend that this time was excessive because the pretrial order was only three pages in length and consisted of eleven exhibits and six witnesses, and the six motions in limine were "fairly standard" and "recycled." (Id.) In response, Gibson argues that because Defendants have not provided their own billing records for this matter, they are "in a weak position" to challenge the reasonableness of the time spent by Gibson's attorneys on these tasks. (R. 81, Pl.'s Reply at 14.) The Court agrees that Defendants' failure to comply with Local Rule 54.3 places them at a disadvantage in seeking a reduction of the hours spent by Gibson's attorneys on reasonableness grounds. See Mostly Memories, Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc., 594 F.Supp.2d 931, 934-35 (N.D.Ill.2009) ("The purpose of Local Rule 54.3 is to avoid `hypocritical' objections to the reasonableness of a fee requested.") (citing Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 569); O'Sullivan v. City of Chi., 484 F.Supp.2d 829, 837 (N.D.Ill.2007) (rejecting excessiveness challenge where, inter alia, "[t]he City has offered no objective standard, no `reasonable' number of hours to spend on a given activity, with which to compare" to the plaintiffs fee request). Nevertheless, even absent Defendants' billing records, the Court concludes after a review of the relevant documents that the time spent by Yarusso on the pretrial order was excessive. Specifically, the Court finds that the 12.7 hours Yarusso spent "reviewing" and "organizing" files for the preparation of the pretrial order were excessive. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot., Ex. 17 at 1.) Gibson has not pointed to any factors in this case such as a large volume of documents that would justify that much time spent "reviewing" and "organizing" documents at such a late stage of the litigation. The Court will reduce this time by half, leading to a deduction of 6.35 hours from Yarusso's request. Additionally, the Court has already reduced the time billed by Jackowiak on these tasks by 3.5 hours based on Defendants'
Next, Defendants argue that the time spent by Jackowiak and Hamilton relating to certain post-trial tasks is not recoverable. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 13-14.) Specifically, Defendants contend that 5.5 hours spent by Jackowiak and four hours expended by Hamilton waiting to speak to jurors after the verdict, meeting with Gibson and co-counsel to debrief after the verdict, and consulting with jurors after the trial should be excluded. (Id.) Given Gibson's failure to justify this time as "reasonably expended," the Court largely sustains Defendants' objection and permits Jackowiak and Hamilton to each recover only one hour of this time. Regarding the "debriefing" time, while meeting with a client after a verdict to discuss post-trial issues is clearly reasonable, Jackowiak's entry indicates that the meeting also covered "lessons learned" and other topics Gibson has failed to show were pertinent to his case. Similarly, Gibson makes no arguments in support of his request for recovery of fees for the time expended waiting for and speaking with the jurors after the verdict. Because Gibson has failed to establish how the time spent on these activities was "reasonably expended," the Court reduces Jackowiak's time by 2.4 hours, and Hamilton's time by 3 hours.
Defendants next contend that the time spent by Gibson's attorneys listening to Office of Emergency Management and Communications recordings and reviewing event queries was excessive. (Id. at 14.) In total, Gibson's attorneys spent 11.1 hours on these tasks. Given that the recordings consisted of fifteen separate short 911 calls and one hour and 22 minutes of dispatch recordings, and the event queries were 25 pages long, the Court finds the time expended by Gibson's attorneys to have been "reasonably expended." Even if the vast majority of the recordings were ultimately not relevant to Gibson's case, his attorneys had to listen to all of the recordings to reach that conclusion. Additionally, as Gibson points out, a key part of his trial strategy was reconstructing a time line of events and correlating that time line with the events in the recordings and police video, and it is reasonable that more than one attorney listened to the recordings given their importance to Gibson's case.
Defendants next argue that Gibson's attorneys spent an excessive amount of time on "interoffice conferences, phone calls, correspondence or other communications among" themselves. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 15.) The Seventh Circuit has recognized that "[t]he practice of law often, indeed usually, involves significant periods of consultation among counsel. Talking through a set of authorities or seeking advice on a vexing problem is often significantly more efficient than one attorney's
Defendants have identified 141.1 hours of time spent by Gibson's attorneys conferring with one another, and request that the Court reduce the amount of time not already deducted based on prior objections by 50%. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 15.) Gibson, however, contends that the time spent by his attorneys in meetings and otherwise communicating reflected a strategy aimed at "efficiently divid[ing] tasks among attorneys while keeping the entire team abreast of important developments." (R. 81, Pl.'s Reply at 15.) Because the Court has already deducted time from Gibson's attorneys for time spent communicating with one another based on other objections, the remaining entries are sufficiently detailed, and Defendants have failed to provide their attorneys' billing sheets as a point of comparison to determine what amount of communication was "patently excessive," the Court, in its discretion, declines to further reduce Gibson's attorneys' hours based on this objection. See Delgado v. Mak, No. 06 C 3757, 2009 WL 211862, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 29, 2009) ("[I]f Defendants had been able to demonstrate that they performed similar tasks with similar results in substantially less time, the Court may well have reduced or eliminated certain entries from the lodestar.").
Finally, Defendants object to the amount of time expended by Gibson's attorneys in preparing the petitions for fees and costs. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 16-18.) While time expended in preparation of a fee petition is compensable, the Seventh Circuit has observed that lawyers often "litigate fee issues with greater energy and enthusiasm than they litigate any other type of issue." Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 987-88 (7th Cir.1988). Accordingly, one factor considered in determining the reasonableness of time spent preparing a fee petition is "the comparison between the hours spent on the merits and the hours spent on the fee petitions." Spegon, 175 F.3d at 554. Where the time expended preparing a fee petition is disproportionate to the time spent on the merits of the case, courts reduce the amount of time recoverable for the preparation of the fee petition. Id. In Ustrak, for example, the prevailing party's attorney spent 15 minutes preparing the fee petition for every hour spent litigating the merits. Ustrak, 851 F.2d at 988. Noting that this was "the tail wagging the dog, with a vengeance[,]" the Seventh Circuit reduced the requested time by two-thirds, and observed that the resulting "allowance is still a generous one." Id.; see also Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir.1999) (affirming district court's reduction of attorney's time spent preparing the attorneys' fee motion from 9.9 hours to 1.6 hours where the attorney spent just under 100 hours litigating the merits of the case).
Here, Defendants have identified a total of 73 hours spent by Gibson's five attorneys in preparing the petitions for fees and costs. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 17.) After reducing the time not "reasonably expended" by Gibson's attorneys detailed above, Gibson's attorneys spent 432.55 hours litigating the merits of this case, meaning that they spent ten minutes preparing the motions for costs and fees for every hour on the merits. Although given
After considering Gibson's requested fees and Defendants' objections, the lodestar in this case stands at $164,419 based on the following breakdown of reasonable hourly rates and hours expended:
Awarded Requested Total Hours Total per
Attorney Hourly Rate hours Reductions Awarded Attorney
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Jackowiak $395 217.6 40.15 (15.75 block billing; 4.6 177.45 $70,092.75
duplicative; 2.4 post-trial; 17.4
fee petition)
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Hamilton $395 135 3 (post-trial) 132 $52,140.00
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Yarusso $350 36.8 9 (6.35 excessive; 2.65 fee 27.8 $9,730.00
petition)
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Nicholas $275 96.8 3.55 (block billing) 93.25 $25,643.75
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Melyon $175 103.7 80.6 (48.7 clerical or otherwise 23.1 $4,042.50
(lawyer rate) not recoverable; 4.2 fee petition;
27.7 paralegal rate)
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Melyon $100 0 27.7 $2,770.00
(paralegal
rate)
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TOTAL $164,419.00
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The calculation of the lodestar figure does not end the Court's inquiry. Although there is "a strong presumption that the lodestar calculation yields a reasonable attorneys' fee award," Pickett, 664 F.3d at 639 (citations omitted), the Supreme Court explained in Hensley:
461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (internal citation omitted). Hensley instructs that where a plaintiff prevails on only some of her interrelated claims, as is the case here, "the district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933. This inquiry proceeds in two steps. First, the Court must decide whether a downward adjustment of Gibson's lodestar recovery is proper under the circumstances. Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir.2010). Second, if a reduction in fees is appropriate, the Court must determine the reasonable amount to reduce the fees given the results actually obtained by Gibson. Id.
The Court now turns to the difficult question of the amount by which to reduce the lodestar due to Gibson's partial success. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[precision is impossible to reach in such calculations[.]" Sottoriva, 617 F.3d at 976. The Supreme Court in Hensley counseled against "a mathematical approach comparing the total number of issues in the case with those actually prevailed upon." 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Seventh Circuit has also "rejected the notion that fees must be calculated proportionally to damages." Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting, Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir.2009). Defendants propose a reduction of 60% based on their argument that the claim on which Gibson prevailed was "the least significant of his three claims," but the Court has already rejected that characterization. Gibson's contention that no reduction is warranted is similarly unpersuasive. Instead, the Court concludes that a reduction of 35% is appropriate. This conclusion is based on three main considerations. First, the jury's verdict, while not insubstantial, constituted only partial success for Gibson and the two claims on which the jury found for Defendants were not merely ancillary claims as Gibson contends. Second, the case was not particularly complex; there were no dispositive motions or novel legal issues addressed by the parties, and the trial lasted only three days. Finally, the Court considers the purpose behind fee shifting statutes such as Section 1988, which is to encourage private enforcement of laws designed to advance civil rights. See Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 873 n. 13 (7th Cir.1995) ("Attorney's fees in Title VII litigation are not limited to a proportion of the monetary damages assessed in the case because, as Congress has recognized, a plaintiff in a civil rights suits acts `not for himself alone but also as a `private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of highest importance.'") (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986)). Based on these considerations, the Court reduces the lodestar amount by 35% to $106,872.35.
Finally, Gibson seeks $2,845.81 in costs under Section 1988. (R. 76, Pl.'s Mot. at 8.) Defendants contend that Gibson is not entitled to recovery for a reusable hard drive used to play videos at trial as well as for Westlaw legal research, and that his costs should be reduced accordingly. (R. 77, Defs.' Resp. at 23-24.) Gibson does
For the foregoing reasons, Gibson's motion for attorneys' fees and costs is granted in part and denied in part. The Court, in its discretion, awards Gibson $106,872.35 in attorneys' fees and $2,743.75 in costs.
